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￿ During the crisis the European Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended
beyond its price stability mandate. In addition to the primary objective of price sta-
bility and the secondary objective of supporting EU economic policies, we identify
ten new tasks related to monetary policy and financial stability.
￿ We argue that there are three main constraints on monetary policy: fiscal domi-
nance, financial repercussions and regional divergences. By assessing the ECB’s
tasks in light of these constraints, we highlight a number of synergies between these
tasks and the ECB’s primary mandate of price stability. 
￿ But we highlight major conflicts of interest related to the ECB’s participation in finan-
cial assistance programmes. We also underline that the ECB’s government bond
purchasing programmes have introduced the concept of ‘monetary policy under
conditionality’, which involves major dilemmas. A solution would be a major change
towards a US-style system, in which state public debts are small, there are no fede-
ral bail-outs for states, the central bank does not purchase state debt and banks do
not hold state debt. Such a change is unrealistic in the foreseeable future.
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1. Additional tasks include
foreign-exchange opera-
tions, foreign reserve man-
agement, operation of the
payments system, advisory




Before the crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB)
focussed on price stability and gained a strong
reputation as its guardian in the euro area. The
average actual inflation rate was very close to the
two percent per year target, and long-term infla-
tionary expectations were anchored at this level.
With the start of the global financial and economic
crisis in the summer of 2007 and the intensifica-
tion of the euro crisis in early 2010, the ECB’s
tasks have been significantly extended, partly at
its own initiative, and partly by legislation adopted
by EU member states, in relation to monetary
policy and beyond.
The ECB adopted wide-ranging measures to sup-
port financial stability and repair the monetary
transmission mechanism, by providing banks with
ample liquidity under revised collateral rules and
by launching two government bond purchasing
programmes. The latter programmes introduced
the concept of ‘monetary policy with conditional-
ity’. The ECB conducted two small-scale quantita-
tive easing programmes (purchasing of covered
bonds) to promote credit growth. The ECB became
a member of the Troika, along with the European
Commission and the IMF, and as a consequence it
has been actively involved in the design and mon-
itoring of the economic conditionality in the con-
text of EU/IMF macroeconomic adjustment
programmes in euro-area countries. Such compe-
tences for the ECB have been formalised and
broadened by the Treaty on the European Stabil-
ity Mechanism (ESM), the euro area’s permanent
rescue fund. The ECB started to take on board
macro-prudential roles by becoming a key partic-
ipant in the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).
Also, the ECB agreed to act as an agent for the sec-
ondary market activities of the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), the rescue funds of the euro
area, and it can play a role in surveillance mis-
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sions within the Macroeconomic Imbalances Pro-
cedure (MIP).
Most of these tasks and roles will remain perma-
nent and major new tasks are being added
because of the development of the Single Super-
visory Mechanism (SSM), the first element of the
European Banking Union. This will probably be the
biggest change in the history of the ECB and will
give it both micro-prudential and macro-pruden-
tial competences. Before assuming the day-to-
day supervisory role, the ECB will have to conduct
a comprehensive asset-quality review of those
financial institutions that will fall under its
umbrella. 
Beyond taking stock of the ECB’s new tasks, this
Policy Contribution assesses the possible syner-
gies and conflicts of interests between these var-
ious tasks. It is important to emphasise that our
goal is not the evaluation of the ECB's response to
the crisis; instead, we take a forward-looking per-
spective to assess the interaction between vari-
ous ECB tasks. We first describe the tasks in the
next section. This is followed by a discussion of
the three main potential constraints to the effec-
tive implementation of monetary policy. After that,
we assess the possible synergies and conflicts.
The final section offers some conclusions.
1 TWELVE TASKS FOR THE ECB
Based on its mandates as defined in the Treaty on
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) and in other Euro-
pean legislation, the ECB has several tasks in the
euro area, some of which have implications for
non-euro area EU countries. Among the various
tasks we highlight the twelve that are the most rel-
evant for monetary policy and financial stability1.
Task 1: Maintaining price stability
The core monetary function of the European03
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2. We note that in July 2013
the ECB added a major new
element to its communica-
tion strategy: forward guid-
ance, which is a way for
central banks to give indica-
tions about their future
policy intentions, by
making it more (like the FED
and the BOE) or less (like
the ECB) explicitly condi-
tional on the assessment of
the current and future eco-
nomic developments and
outlook.
3. For detailed reviews of
the ECB crisis responses,
see Cour-Thimann and
Winkler (2013) and ECB
(2011a).
4. For a very detailed review
of the legal technicalities of
the ELA see Boyer and
Lemangnen (2013). 
banks (Pisani-Ferry and Wolff, 2012a), at a time
when the interbank market had become dysfunc-
tional and several countries in the south of the
euro area were undergoing a sudden stop in exter-
nal financing (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012a). In
October 2008, the ECB introduced a policy of ‘full
allotment’, for all ECB liquidity-providing opera-
tions. Under this procedure, the control of central
bank liquidity is effectively moved from the cen-
tral bank to the banking system, as banks can
access all the central bank liquidity they need at
a fixed rate (if they priovide sufficient eligible col-
lateral). The maturity of liquidity operations were
initially extended from three months to six and
twelve months, and in December 2011 and in Feb-
ruary 2012 the ECB also conducted two extraordi-
nary Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)
with maturities of three years, from which banks in
the euro area borrowed almost €1 trillion. These
operations, along with the collateral policy (see
below) allowed liquidity-strained banks to refi-
nance a large portion of their balance sheets
through central bank lending, available at a low
interest rate and long-term maturity. In a heavily
bank-based system, such as the euro area’s
(Darvas, 2013a), these measures were essential
to avoid financial and economic meltdown.
Another crucial element during the crisis was
Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA), an emer-
gency liquidity line provided by national central
banks to solvent banks that exceptionally and
temporarily do not have enough (or sufficiently
high quality collateral) to access normal Eurosys-
tem operations. The ECB’s Governing Council can
at any time order an ELA programme to be
stopped4. The ELA statistics are opaque, yet most
likely the central banks of Greece, Ireland and
Cyprus have used ELA extensively, while it was
used for a few days in Belgium. Recent rumours
suggest that Portugal also made use of ELA.
Task 4: Collateral policy
Complementing its credit operations, the ECB has
changed its collateral framework several times
System of Central Banks (ESCB), which is gov-
erned by the decision-making bodies of the ECB, is
laid down in Article 127(1) of the TFEU, according
to which: “The primary objective of the European
System of Central Banks [...] shall be to maintain
price stability”. The numerical definition of price
stability (“below but close to 2 percent inflation
over the medium-term”) is not laid down in the
Treaty, but was set by the ECB’s Governing Council.
In pursuing its task to preserve price stability, the
ECB acts in full independence from any EU insti-
tutions, bodies, offices and agencies and from
member state governments. In normal times, the
main tools for achieving price stability are interest
rate policy, short-term liquidity management and
communication2.
Task 2: Supporting EU economic policies
Article 127(1) of the TFEU continues by stating
that “Without prejudice to the objective of price
stability, the ESCB shall support the general eco-
nomic policies in the Union with a view to con-
tributing to the achievement of the objectives of
the Union”. The latter are listed in Article 3 of the
TFEU and include inter alia “balanced economic
growth” and “a highly competitive social market
economy, aiming at full employment and social
progress”.
The specific price-stability mandate and these
rather broad other Treaty-based mandates paved
the way for the ECB to venture into unconventional
monetary policy during the global and euro-area
crises3. Most of the measures are still operational
and could remain in the toolkit for some time.
Task 3: Lender of last resort for banks
Unlike the Federal Reserve (Fed), the Bank of Eng-
land (BOE) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ), which
relied extensively on asset purchase interven-
tions, the ECB’s unconventional monetary opera-
tions have been mostly concentrated on ensuring
the necessary supply of liquidity to euro-area
‘The price-stability mandate and the other Treaty-based mandate to support the general eco-
nomic policies in the EU paved the way for the ECB to venture into unconventional monetary
policy during the crisis, which was essential to avoid financial and economic meltdown.’5. Cour-Thimann and Winkler
(2013) estimate that the
size of the first programme
represented about 2.5
percent of the outstanding
covered bonds.
6. De Sousa and Papadia
(2013) estimate that the
SMP would have been a
profitable operation under





since 2008, expanding and changing assets’
eligibility requirements in order to mitigate
possible constraints arising from collateral
shortage. It is worth mentioning that certain credit
claims have been included among eligible
collaterals. Also, while initially the ECB denied the
need for country-specific collateral rules, credit-
rating requirements were completely abolished
for government bonds of countries under financial
assistance programmes.
Task 5: Quantitative easing: targeted credit easing
through asset purchases
The ECB introduced two asset purchase pro-
grammes – though at a much smaller scale than
the Fed, BOE and BOJ. Under the first Covered Bond
Purchase Programme (CBPP), launched in 2009
and terminated in June 2010, the Eurosystem
committed to buy covered bonds up to €60 billion,
while in November 2011 the second CBPP com-
mitment was up to €40 billion until October 20125.
The goals of these programmes were “(a) easing
funding conditions for credit institutions and
enterprises; and (b) encouraging credit institu-
tions to maintain and expand lending to their
clients”.
Task 6: Sterilised government bond purchases
The ECB launched two government bond purchas-
ing programmes: the Securities Market Pro-
gramme (SMP) on 10 May 2010, which on 6
September 2012 was terminated and replaced by
the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs). While
monetary financing of governments is strictly pro-
hibited, Article 18(1) of the ESCB Statute allows
national central banks and the ECB to buy or sell
(among others) marketable instruments on the
financial markets. Both programmes had similar
aims: the SMP’s “objective is to address the mal-
functioning of securities markets and restore an
appropriate monetary policy transmission mech-
anism” and the OMTs “aim at safeguarding an
appropriate monetary policy transmission and the
singleness of the monetary policy.”In the frame-
work of the SMP, the Eurosystem bought on the
secondary market about €220 billion of the sov-
ereign bonds of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and
Spain. At the end of 2011, the ECB’s holding was
estimated to amount to about 23 percent of total
outstanding in Greece, 16 percent in Ireland, 11
percent in Portugal, 6 percent in Italy and 5 per-
cent in Spain (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012b)6. All
the purchases were sterilised (ie the liquidity pro-
vided was re-absorbed by the Eurosystem) to
ensure that the monetary stance was not affected.
The SMP could not bring definitive relief to mar-
kets, while the OMT has to date been more suc-
cessful (see Darvas, 2012). It is based on explicit
conditionality: compliance with a full or precau-
tionary macroeconomic adjustment programme
by either the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF) or the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM). Countries exiting current adjustment pro-
grammes could also be considered. ECB interven-
tion will not be automatic, but the Governing
Council will decide on a case-by-case basis when
and to what extent it will intervene. OMTs will be
unlimited in principle; limited only by the out-
standing stock of eligible bonds, which should
have residual maturity of between one and three
years (the relevant horizon for monetary trans-
mission). The ECB will not have any preferential
treatment in the case of a credit event (ie pari
passu treatment with other creditors). Since the
programme's inauguration, no country has quali-
fied for OMT.
Task 7: Designing, approving and monitoring
financial assistance programmes
The Troika of the IMF, the EU and the ECB was inau-
gurated in spring 2010 to negotiate the Greek
financial assistance programme. The participation
of the ECB, and of the IMF, was demanded by the
heads of state or government in their 25 March
2010 statement7. The Troika also negotiated the
financial assistance programmes for Ireland, Por-
tugal and Cyprus, and the new programmes for
Greece, and concluded joint missions to assess
compliance.
The ESM Treaty formalises the ECB’s role in cover-
ing the whole process of granting and monitoring
financial assistance programmes. “The European
Commission, in liaison with the ECB, shall be
entrusted with”several tasks, such as “assessing
the existence of a risk to the financial stability of
the euro area as a whole or of its Member States;
Assessing whether public debt is sustainable;
Assessing the actual or potential financing needs









of the ESM Member concerned” (Article 13(1)),
“...the task of negotiating, with the ESM Member
concerned, a memorandum of understanding [...]
detailing the conditionality attached to the finan-
cial assistance facility”(Article 13(3)), and “mon-
itoring compliance with the conditionality
attached to the financial assistance facility”(Arti-
cle 13(7)). Wherever appropriate and possible, the
IMF’s involvement will be sought.
When emergency voting is needed, it “shall be
used where the Commission and the ECB both
conclude that a failure to urgently adopt a deci-
sion to grant or implement financial assistance
[...] would threaten the economic and financial
sustainability of the euro area”(Article 4).
The ECB will be also involved in forming an opin-
ion on other aspects of ESM operations, including
possible secondary market support: “decisions on
interventions on the secondary market to address
contagion shall be taken on the basis of an analy-
sis of the ECB recognising the existence of excep-
tional financial market circumstances and risks
to financial stability”(Article 18).
Task 8: Micro-prudential supervision
Arguably, the most significant change to the ECB’s
structure has been brought about by the decision
to give to it significant supervisory responsibilities
in the framework of the Single Supervisory Mech-
anism (SSM), which is the first element of the
European Banking Union. The legal basis is pro-
vided by Article 127(6) of the TFEU: “The Council,
acting by means of regulations in accordance
with a special legislative procedure, may unani-
mously, and after consulting the European Parlia-
ment and the European Central Bank, confer
specific tasks upon the European Central Bank
concerning policies relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and other finan-
cial institutions with the exception of insurance
undertakings”.
After extensive negotiations between various
stakeholders, on 12 September 2013 the Euro-
pean Parliament gave its consent with the
amended draft Council Regulation on conferring
the aforementioned tasks “with a view to con-
tributing to the safety and soundness of credit
institutions and the stability of the financial
system within the EU and each Member State”
(Article 1 of the Regulation).
Starting in Autumn 2014, the ECB will supervise
“significant”credit institutions (as defined by the
regulation; see eg Darvas and Wolff, 2013), and
will have exclusive competence for those “specific
supervisory tasks which are crucial to ensure a
coherent and effective implementation of the
Union's policy relating to the prudential supervi-
sion of credit institutions”. Such tasks include in
particular: authorising (and withdrawing authori-
sation) of credit institutions; assessing the impli-
cations for the acquisition and disposal of
qualifying holdings in credit institutions (except
in cases of bank resolution); ensuring compliance
with the EU rules on own funds requirements,
securitisation, large exposure limits, liquidity,
leverage, and reporting and public disclosure of
information on those matters; ensuring compli-
ance with governance rules, risk management
processes, internal control mechanisms, remu-
neration policies and practices and effective inter-
nal capital adequacy assessment processes;
carrying out supervisory reviews, including stress
tests, on the basis of which to impose on credit
institutions specific requirements; carrying out
supervisory tasks in relation to recovery plans,
and early intervention where a supervised entity
does not meet or is likely to breach the applicable
prudential requirements.
Task 9: Comprehensive balance-sheet assessment
Related to assuming the role of the single super-
visor, the ECB should perform “a comprehensive
assessment, including a balance-sheet assess-
ment, of the credit institutions” (Article 27(4) of
the SSM draft regulation), before actually taking
on the new supervisory responsibilities. We high-
‘Arguably, the most significant change to the ECB’s structure has been brought about by the
decision to give to it significant supervisory responsibilities in the framework of the Single





light this role, because this is a major task that will
likely have an impact on the reputation of the ECB
for its supervisory mandate and beyond.
Task 10: Macro-prudential supervision
The ECB’s macro-prudential tasks are related to the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the
SSM.
The ESRB was set up in 2010, gathering represen-
tatives from national central banks and supervi-
sors from all EU countries. The ESRB became part
of the European System of Financial Supervision
(ESFS) and it will be required to cooperate closely
with the other participants in the ESFS8. The ESRB,
according to its mandate, “shall be responsible for
the macro-prudential oversight of the financial
system within the Union in order to contribute to
the prevention or mitigation of systemic risks to
financial stability [...] that arise from develop-
ments within the financial system and taking into
account macro-economic developments, so as to
avoid periods of widespread financial distress”.
The ESRB was not given any direct authority over
policy instruments, but it has the power to issue
recommendations and warnings about systemic
risks to national authorities. The decision-making
body of the ESRB, the General Board, is chaired by
the president of the ECB. The ESRB Secretariat is
located at the ECB.
The SSM Draft Regulation provides a role for both
the ECB and national supervisors in macro-pru-
dential policy, under the principle of ‘the stronger
wins’. While the ECB can express objections to
measures proposed by a national authority, the
authority concerned only has to “duly consider the
ECB’s reasons prior to proceeding with the deci-
sion” (Article 4a(1)). The ECB cannot block such
measures. On the other hand, the ECB is given the
power to apply higher requirements for capital
buffers and more stringent measures than those
set by the national authorities, with the aim of
addressing systemic or macro-prudential risks.
And again the ECB is only obliged to “duly con-
sider”the objections of national supervisor, if any,
but these objections do not have blocking power. 
It is important to highlight that the macro-pruden-
tial tools available to the ECB will be more limited
than the arsenal available to national supervisors.
National supervisors can apply “any [other]
measures aimed at addressing systemic or
macro-prudential risks provided for, and subject
to the procedures set out, in the Directives
2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC”, but the ECB can
only apply “higher requirements for capital buffers
... in addition to own funds requirements ... includ-
ing countercyclical buffer rates”. Therefore, the
ECB can apply those tools seeking to influence
lenders’ behaviour, as categorised by Blanchard,
Dell’Ariccia and Mauro (2013), but the ECB cannot
apply tools aimed at controlling borrowers’ behav-
iour, such as loan-to-value ratios and debt-to-
income ratios.
Task 11: Possible participation in macroeconomic
surveillance missions
The so-called six-pack, which governs the EU’s
new Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP),
foresees a possible role for the ECB in macroeco-
nomic surveillance missions. Article 9 of Regula-
tion No 1176/2011 dealing with “Monitoring of
corrective action” says that: “The Commission
may carry out enhanced surveillance missions to
the Member State concerned, in order to monitor
the implementation of the corrective action plan,
in liaison with the ECB when those missions con-
cern Member States whose currency is the euro...”.
Article 13(3) clarifies the role of the ECB in these
surveillance missions: “Where the Member State
concerned is a Member State whose currency is
the euro or is participating in ERM II, the Commis-
sion may, if appropriate, invite representatives of
the European Central Bank to participate in sur-
veillance missions”.
Therefore, it seems that the ECB will have only a
low profile in macroeconomic surveillance mis-
sions, but no specific tasks and responsibilities
are related to such missions, nor to other ele-
ments of the MIP process. 
Task 12: Agent for the secondary market activities
of the ESFS and ESM
In December 2011, the ECB agreed to act as an
agent for the secondary market activities of the
EFSF and the same role is foreseen for the ESM9.
The ESCB statute allows such operations (under
the prohibition of overdraft or any other kind of
8. As well as the ESRB, the
ESFS comprises: the Euro-
pean Banking Authority
(EBA), the European Insur-
ance and Occupational Pen-
sions Authority (EIOPA), the
European Securities and
Markets Authority (ESMA),
the Joint Committee of the
European Supervisory
Authorities (ESAs), and the
competent or supervisory
authorities in the member
states as specified in the
legislation establishing the
three ESAs.
9. See question 36 on page
19 of the Frequently Asked
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credit facilities). In this role, the ECB would merely
execute the EFSF/ESM’s decisions on secondary
market operations.
All in all, beyond the primary objective of price sta-
bility, the ECB has a Treaty-based mandate to sup-
port the EU's broader goals related to growth,
competitiveness, employment, social progress,
the soundness of credit institutions and financial
stability, while the ESM Treaty broadened the
responsibilities of the ECB in financial assistance
programmes. The ECB’s role in macroeconomic
surveillance will have a low profile, while it can
also act as the agent of the EFSF and ESM on the
secondary government bond markets. 
2 MONETARY POLICY CONSTRAINTS
There are at least three main constraints on mon-
etary policy, which all have a bearing on the
assessment of the various tasks of a central bank:
fiscal dominance, financial repercussions and
regional divergences. We highlight these con-
straints before assessing the ECB’s tasks in the
next section.
Fiscal dominance
Fiscal dominance describes a situation in which
there is a threat to fiscal sustainability due to large
public debt and budget deficit, potentially endan-
gering financial and macroeconomic stability. This
limits the freedom of the central banks (either
indirectly by internalising the threat from fiscal
unsustainability, or directly by pressure from the
government) in pursuing the price-stability goal
freely. The central bank can influence government
borrowing costs in various ways and under fiscal
dominance it may act to help fiscal sustainability,
to the detriment of its core price stability mandate.
Financial repercussions
Financial sector vulnerability is a key constraint.
The period in the run-up to the global financial and
economic crisis has clearly indicated that price
stability (defined as low and stable inflation) in
itself is insufficient to promote stable and durable
economic growth. On both sides of the Atlantic,
major financial vulnerabilities were built up, which
erupted suddenly, leading to major economic con-
tractions, high unemployment and undershooting
of the inflation target during the crisis. In Europe,
banking fragility continues to constrain monetary
transmission even five years after the demise of
Lehman Brothers.
Regional divergences
Regional divergences, such as the build-up of
macroeconomic imbalances (diverging external
positions and price competitiveness) were partic-
ularly notable in the euro area, where there is no
centralised fiscal authority to smooth regional
shocks, and where intra-regional adjustment
mechanisms work much less effectively than in
federal states, like the United States. Particularly
weak economic conditions in some regions of a
monetary union, in the absence of proper adjust-
ment mechanisms, undermine the ‘one size fits
all’ property of monetary policy (Figure 1 on the
next page, panels B, C and D). But the vicious circle
between banks and sovereigns (whereby banks
hold a large amount of the debt of the government
of their home country and are expected to be
bailed out by the same government) in some
euro-area countries further pushed both banks
and governments to the abyss, thereby leading to
major differences in the transmission of monetary
policy across the members of the euro area. While
at the present economic juncture the optimal rates
warranted for, eg Spain (and also for a number of
other euro-area countries), would be much lower
than in Germany, actual lending rates are much
higher in Spain, partly because of the fragmenta-
tion of euro-area financial markets, and partly
because of higher risks and weaker economic out-
look in Spain, which in turn are related to the build-
up of the pre-crisis macroeconomic imbalances.
Therefore, macroeconomic imbalances can
hamper the proper transmission of the ECB’s mon-
etary policy.
3 SYNERGIES AND CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE
ECB’S TASKS
The key take-away from the previous section is
that the conditions for proper conduct of monetary
policy across the regions of a monetary union are
sound public finances, sound banks and financial
stability and balanced economic development. We
assess the various tasks assigned to, or adopted08
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by, the ECB in light of this lesson. There are sev-
eral interactions between the ECB’s task. Here we
focus on five issues that we regard as most impor-
tant, starting with the easiest to solve, and ending
with the most difficult.
Long-term liquidity operations: easy to remedy
the dangers
In normal times, central banks did not engage in
really long-term liquidity operations (recall that
before the crisis, the maturity of ECB’s LTROs was
three months). A reason for this is related to moral
hazard: long-term central bank financing at rates
below what banks could get from the market might
encourage excessive risk taking. Also, such oper-
ations may keep alive otherwise insolvent banks. 
The ECB’s 3-year LTROs reduced the risk that sol-
vent banks could become insolvent because of
liquidity constraints, and it also contributed,
though only temporarily, to the stabilisation of Ital-
ian and Spanish government bond markets (see
Darvas and Savelin, 2012), which was a major
achievement at that time. But they did little to trig-
ger lending to the private sector. To a great extent,
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(A) Euro area aggregate (B) Intra-euro area diversity of
Taylor rule recommendations
(C) Intra-euro area diversity of
Taylor rule recommendations
(D) Intra-euro area diversity of
Taylor rule recommendations
Figure 1: Taylor rule recommendations for the ECB interest rate, 1999Q1-2013Q3
Source: Bruegel using the methodology of Mechio (2011). Notes: Taylor rule target = 1 + 1.5 x inflation – 1 x unemployment
gap. Similarly to Mechio (2011), we use core inflation (all items HICP excluding volatile food and energy prices) and the devia-
tion of the actual unemployment rate from the estimated non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), as esti-
mated by the OECD. MRO = Main refinancing operations. The 2013Q3 recommendation is based on July-August 2013 inflation
rate and the July 2013 unemployment rate. The countries are ordered according to the average absolute deviation from the
euro-area recommendation in 1999-2013, ie developments in France were the closest to the euro-area average and Ireland was
the farthest from the euro-area average. See Darvas and Merler (2013) for a more in-depth discussion of this figure.09
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funding at the ECB for rainy days, or purchased
higher yielding government bonds. Thereby, the
LTROs in effect supported liquidity, ensured stable
long-term (3-year) financing, subsidised the bank-
ing system and helped to restore profitability, and
temporarily supported distressed government
bond markets. When the alternative was a poten-
tially escalating financial crisis, these achieve-
ments were beneficial.
But Belke (2012) and Pill (2013) rightly argue that
the LTROs delayed the bank restructuring efforts
and prolonged the existence of non-viable banks,
with major negative side effects.The remedies for
this are obvious: the ECB can foster bank restruc-
turing by performing in the toughest possible way
the comprehensive balance-sheet assessment
(task 9 in section 2) before it takes over the single
supervisory role. After that, the ECB's micro-pru-
dential supervisory powers (task 8) should be
used to ensure that all banks receiving liquidity
support have indeed only a liquidity problem, and
not a solvency problem.
This is even more relevant in the context of the
ELA, where the dividing line is less clear and where
the pressure is the highest, because the impact of
a decision for or against the granting of emergency
liquidity can have significant financial stability
consequences. The case of Cyprus, where the
existence of major banking problems was proba-
bly known well before the dramatic days in March
2013 (when banks were closed down for several
days and uninsured depositors suffered massive
losses), but where ELA was provided to banks on
a massive scale, is exemplary in this respect. Fur-
thermore, to dispel all doubts that liquidity provi-
sion to banks is back-door financing of public debt
(whereby banks borrow cheap from the ECB to
purchase government bonds), longer-term ECB
financing could be conditioned that banks do not
increase their net lending to the government
and/or increase their net lending to the real econ-
omy (see Darvas, 2013b).
Monetary, micro- and macro-prudential policies:
good siblings
There is a potential synergy between monetary,
micro-prudential and macro-prudential policies, ie
tasks 1, 8 and 10 (section 2). As we argued, risk
may be building up in the financial sector and
asset prices deviate upward from fundamental
levels even without significant movement in CPI
inflation. The potential for monetary policy to react
would be limited in that case, because monetary
policy does not take asset prices into account but
generally targets consumer-price inflation. On the
other hand, low interest rates, which are needed
to stimulate demand in an economic downturn,
may encourage excessive risk taking by the finan-
cial sector, which could be counteracted by strong
micro-prudential supervision and macro-pruden-
tial tools (Farhi and Tirole, 2012). 
The synergy between these policies can be even
stronger in a heterogeneous monetary union, like
EMU, in which there are divergences in inflation
dynamics at the regional (or country) level. The
counteractive role of monetary policy is even
more limited in this case, because the central
bank targets the average inflation rate. As Blan-
chard et al (2013) argue, in such a heterogeneous
union, macro-prudential tools have to contribute
to the management of aggregate demand too.
Yet as Blanchard et al (2013) highlight, the key
questions is the organisation of these policies:
should they belong to a single institution or inde-
pendent institutions? We agree with their conclu-
sion that when none of them works perfectly,
combining them in the same institution brings
more benefits than possible costs.
Certainly, there are associated risks. For example,
a main argument against giving the same institu-
tion both price and financial stability mandates is
that the latter might undermine the former: when
monetary policy considerations may necessitate
increasing the interest rate, the merged institution
may be reluctant to raise interest rates, if it endan-
gers financial stability, and therefore the inflation
rate may overshoot the target. At least so far, this
risk is not shared by market participants, as the
five-year ahead inflationary expectations in the
euro area continue to be anchored to the two per-
cent target, even though more recently the ECB’s
supervisory role became a certainty (Figure 2 on
the next page).
Another main risk would be reputational. The pos-
sibility of supervisory failures or, more generally,10
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of negative events occurring within the remit of
banking supervision, cannot be excluded, and the
risk is that any blow to the central bank as super-
visor could negatively spill over to the credibility of
the central bank as the guardian of price stability
(Goodhart, 2000).
An additional risk pointed out by Goodhart (2000)
is the possibility that the central bank could lose
independence and become politically captured,
by taking up a role that is particularly sensitive
from a political perspective. It could be argued that
the SSM structure can potentially mitigate this risk
with respect to a decentralised system, by bring-
ing national supervisors together and subjecting
them to a certain degree of peer pressure. 
Overall, the risk that the ECB’s financial supervi-
sory role may undermine its monetary policy does
not seem too high. 
There is a synergy between micro-prudential
supervision and the assessment of risk to the
financial system as a whole, which falls within the
macro-prudential remit of the ECB. Information
about the financial system – including at the insti-
tution-level – is a crucial variable for the effective
conduct of macro-prudential policy.
Concerning the macro-prudential tools available
to the ECB, their limitations may constrain effec-
tiveness. The ECB cannot impose, for example,
limitations on loan-to-value ratios. This is a major
shortcoming, because housing is a very important
source of macro risk and housing bubbles have
frequently been associated with financial crises.
The national supervisory authorities will have
such tools: it will to be seen if national supervisors
will be as vigilant as the ECB in pinpointing hous-
ing bubbles. While the housing sector is typically
politically sensitive, it would have been better to
entrust the ECB with direct tools to include this
sector. 
One way to circumvent this limitation would be to
involve the ECB more in macroeconomic surveil-
lance. As highlighted by task 11 in section 2, the
ECB will have negligible role in the Macroeconomic
Imbalances Procedure, which is also designed to
identify similar vulnerabilities.
More generally, to the extent that the evolution of
the financial cycle – which is generally agreed to
be the ‘target’ of macro-prudential policy – can be
driven by the development of underlying macro-
economic imbalances in the economy, the
involvement of the ECB in the field of macroeco-
nomic surveillance seems complementary to the
conduct of macro-prudential competences that it
has been assigned.
Overall, we regard it a wise decision to entrust the
ECB with micro- and macro-prudential compe-
tences, yet the limitations to the ECB’s macro-pru-
dential tools may constrain effectiveness. 
Monetary policy and bank supervision: internal
separation within the ECB to be reconsidered
The draft SSM Regulation requires as much sepa-
ration as possible of financial supervision from
monetary policy within the ECB. But is this sepa-
ration needed? We highlighted some points in
favour of separation in the previous section and
concluded that they are not decisive. 
Also, there is not a unanimous agreement in the
literature on whether the two functions should be
kept separate (see Beck and Gros, 2012, for an
overview of the literature). It is not unusual for
central banks to be in charge of supervisory
responsibility. Fourteen out of the seventeen
national central banks in the euro area have a role
in supervision and so do several major central


































































































































Figure 2: Euro-area inﬂation: actual and
expected, December 1998 to June 2013
Source: ECB. Note: percent change compared to the same
month of the previous year, using the harmonised index of
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10. In their final agreement
before the 12 September
2013 vote of the European
Parliament, EP President
Martin Schulz and ECB Pres-
ident Mario Draghi agreed
over transparency, under
which the ECB will send
detailed confidential
accounts of the minutes of
its bank supervisory board
meetings.
11. For an extensive evalua-
tion of the Troika’s operate
and set-up see Pisani-Ferry,
Sapir and Wolff (2013). Pre-
liminary assessments of
the specific role played by
the ECB and of the potential
conflicts of interest for the
central bank had been con-
ducted also by Merler,
Pisani-Ferry and Wolff
(2012). This section is
largely based on these two
works.
There can be significant synergies between mon-
etary policy and supervision. ECB president Draghi
himself has stressed that “it is an established fact
that stronger supervision facilitates the conduct
of monetary policy” (Draghi, 2012). One reason
for this is that the banking system plays a crucial
role in the transmission of monetary policy
impulses to the economy and therefore in the
achievement of the central bank’s goal. This is
especially the case in times of crisis, when the
banking system comes under heightened stress,
the monetary transmission mechanism can be
impaired and the standard monetary policy tools
(the short-term interest rate) can become power-
less. This synergy constitutes a rationale for the
central bank to have an interest in the stability of
the financial system (Constâncio, 2013) and
therefore in its effective supervision, as the latter
“contributes to a stable financial system [and]
can only benefit the smooth transmission of mon-
etary policy”(Draghi, 2012). Therefore, if it is true
that in crisis times the line between (unconven-
tional) monetary policy and financial supervision
becomes less clear, it is also true that in such a sit-
uation output and inflation are subject to down-
side risks, and financial stability and price stability
actions would go in the same direction, making a
conflict unlikely.
Also, as we concluded at the start of this section,
using supervisory information will help the ECB in
deciding which banks are solvent but illiquid, and
which banks are insolvent, which would be essen-
tial for its function as the lender of last resort to
banks. As pointed out by Whelan (2012), the
experience with Northern Rock in 2007 shows
how coordination of different authorities can be
insufficient to solve the problems associated with
the lender of last resort not being involved in
supervision. The fact that the removal of banking
supervision from the Bank of England – decided
in 1997 – is now being reversed, can perhaps be
taken as a sign that strictly separating bank super-
vision and monetary policy may be suboptimal.
A more practical question is if a full organisational
separation of the two functions within the ECB is
possible. The Supervisory Board will consist of five
representatives of the ECB and potentially the rep-
resentatives of all euro-area central banks. As
pointed out by Beck and Gros (2012), it is very dif-
ficult to imagine how national central bank repre-
sentatives could not be in very close contact,
especially since one (the governor) would be hier-
archically superior to the other (the head of super-
vision). The final decision will anyway remain with
the Governing Council, even though the latter is
supposed to operate “in a completely differenti-
ated manner”when dealing with monetary policy
and with supervision. But it would be the same
people deciding and it is hard to see how they
would not use all the information at their disposal,
when taking a decision.
It is also noteworthy that in the Bank of England,
such a separation was not sought: 
“The new system ... encourages co-opera-
tion and co-ordination across the different
policy bodies. [...] There is overlap between the
memberships of the FPC, the PRA Board and the
MPC, including the Governor and the Deputy
Governor for Financial Stability both being
members of all three policymaking bodies. This
will support the flow of information across the
different bodies and an understanding of their
approaches and likely reactions to events”
(BoE 2013, page 26).
Certainly, the ECB is accountable in different ways
for monetary policy and financial supervisory
decisions, and the European Parliament rightly
requested more detailed information about super-
visory decisions10. But it would be not too difficult
to ensure that supervisory decisions are more
transparent for the Parliament even when there is
greater information sharing within the ECB
between the two areas.
We therefore conclude that the efforts made in the
draft SSM regulation to separate monetary policy
and financial supervision within the ECB may not
have been so important. 
Designing and monitoring of financial assis-
tance programmes: a dangerous liaison
The role played by the ECB in the Troika is ambigu-
ous11and difficult to assess. The local central bank
is always included in negotiations on IMF financial
assistance programmes, but since the central
banks of programme countries in the euro area are12
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part of the Eurosystem, the ECB could not have
been left out. However, the ECB sits on the same
side of the table with lenders (IMF and the Euro-
pean Commission), while in a typical IMF pro-
gramme, the central bank of a country with its own
currency would sit with the national authorities.
There are three additional reasons for ECB involve-
ment (Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff, 2013). First,
the European leaders trusted the ECB and wanted
it to be part of the European negotiation team
alongside the Commission. Second, European
leaders feared possible recommendations from
the IMF that would have challenged ECB policies
and therefore wanted to make it possible for the
central bank to participate in the policy discus-
sions. Third, the ECB had a very significant expo-
sure to programme countries (through its liquidity
operation with banks) without having any legal
hold over the supervisory assessment of its bank-
ing system. Participation in the Troika gave to the
ECB the possibility to perform a better assessment
of potential risks to its balance sheet, and to have
a say over decisions that might affect it.
All of these reasons will likely characterise future
ESM programmes. But the ECB’s participation in
the design and monitoring of financial assistance
programmes creates potential conflicts of interest
with the other mandates of the ECB.
First, there is a potential conflict with the ECB’s
prime activity of monetary policy, and in particu-
lar, price stability. In the implementation phase of
programmes, the ECB might be tempted to deviate
from its price stability objective in order to help
improve fiscal sustainability in a given programme
country. Ex ante, the fear that fiscal unsustain-
ability in a particular country might result in pres-
sure on the central bank to soften its monetary
stance might lead the ECB to overemphasise the
need for fiscal consolidation. However, it should
be stressed that this problem is not specific to the
participation of the ECB in the Troika, because
fiscal dominance coming from non-programme
euro-area countries can also undermine the price
‘The ECB’s participation in the design and monitoring of financial assistance programmes cre-
ates potential conflicts of interest with its other tasks, which may bias programme conditional-
ity and exposes the ECB to pressure from the other Troika institutions.’
stability mandate (see section 3). In this context,
we note that fiscal sustainability in larger euro-
area countries, such as Italy and Spain, provides a
greater threat to financial stability than fiscal sus-
tainability in current programme countries (which
are all much smaller). Therefore irrespective of the
ECB’s participation in the Troika, it may be tempted
to opt for higher inflation than the target.
The experience so far has clearly demonstrated
that this is not the case, even though Greek public
debt became unsustainable and so far two rounds
of public debt restructuring have been imple-
mented. On the contrary, the major risk at the
moment is that inflation undershoots the target in
the coming years (even the ECB’s own forecast for
2013-14 is well below the target), while the ECB
does not act to counterbalance it. This will make
the adjustment of countries in southern Europe
much more difficult, because when average euro-
area inflation undershoots the two percent target,
the conflict between intra-euro relative price
adjustment and debt sustainability is more severe
(Darvas, 2013c).
Second, there is a potential conflict of interest with
the ECB’s function of lender of last resort to banks.
Banks in programme countries are typically under
high stress and may need to rely heavily on ECB
liquidity. Ex ante, the ECB might seek to minimise
liquidity operations that constitute a risk to its own
balance sheet, and to label banking problems as
solvency problems that would need to be
addressed through state bail-out or through bail-in
of private shareholders and creditors. Ex post
however, the ECB might actually be inclined to
provide liquidity on soft terms, as would any
central bank interested in the success of the
programme, by acting on the strictness of its
collateral framework or of the ELA provision. Again,
this possible conflict is not specific to financial
assistance programmes, as the ECB may act
similarly with respect to non-programme
countries. But the ECB’s participation in the design
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Third, there is a potential conflict of interest with
the ECB’s bond-purchase programmes. By buying
bonds of vulnerable countries in the context of the
SMP or OMT, the ECB becomes formally a creditor
of the governments receiving financial assistance,
and this may influence its position in the negotia-
tions. Fear of losses stemming from its bond hold-
ings might lead the ECB to be especially tough on
fiscal consolidation or especially timid on debt
restructuring – if the latter were needed – to
reduce the likelihood of losses on its holdings. The
Greek case, in which the ECB loudly rejected debt
restructuring even a few weeks before such a deci-
sion was made by euro-area heads of state, and
then negotiated a special position so that ECB
holdings of Greek government bonds were not
restructured, clearly underlines this threat. Also,
a highly problematic issue with respect to the
ECB’s OMT is the introduction of an explicit condi-
tionality set-up in the conduct of monetary policy,
which is particularly delicate and dangerous, and
is dealt with in the next section.
In conclusion, the unclear nature of the ECB’s
hybrid role in the Troika raises concerns about
possible conflicts of interest that the ECB could
experience in relation to the conduct of its other
functions. This role, which the ECB took on in emer-
gency at the time of the first Greek programme, is
now being crystallised into a permanent compe-
tence by the ESM Treaty (see task 7 in section 2).
The ECB will have a say both ex ante, in the pre-
liminary assessment of the decision to grant sup-
port, and ex post, in the monitoring of
conditionality, thus being in the delicate position
of having to balance considerations of financial
and fiscal stability.
A better option would have been a ‘light’ participa-
tion of the ECB in financial assistance pro-
grammes, such as voicing concerns, beyond
obtaining information, which is in line with the
conclusions of Pisani-Ferry, Sapir and Wolff
(2012). However, this option is not feasible with-
out a change to the ESM Treaty.
Monetary policy with conditionality: major
dilemmas
Government bond purchases by the ECB, which
reduce the yields and increase the price of gov-
ernment bonds, can help the transmission of mon-
etary policy through three main channels (see
ECB, 2012a):
1 Price channel: ‘excessive’ government bond
yields increase the yields for the private sector,
because government yields are typically taken
as a benchmark, and therefore a reduction in
the government bond yield reduces the yields
for the private sector;
2 Balance-sheet channel: government bond pur-
chases can lead to a fall in government bond
yields/increase in the price of government
bonds, which improves bank balance sheets
and thereby the ability of banks to lend to the
non-financial sector, because they hold signif-
icant amounts of government bonds;
3 Liquidity channel: pressure on the sovereign
bond markets makes it substantially more dif-
ficult for banks to access liquidity on the inter-
bank market, when government bonds are
used in repo markets as collateral and as a
benchmark for the haircut applied to other
instruments. Government bond purchases by
the ECB can reduce such pressure.
While these benefits and their link to monetary
policy transmission are straightforward, and it is
fair to say that without the SMP and OMT the euro
area would have likely been engulfed by a finan-
cial meltdown, there are number of concerns with
ECB government bond purchases:
a Even if purchases are conducted on the sec-
ondary market, they are on the ‘borderline’ with
debt monetisation. There may be investors who
purchase bonds on the primary market only
because they know that they can sell these
bonds to the ECB on the secondary market,
thereby they ‘intermediate’ the ECB’s second-
ary market purchases to the primary market.
b Such an implicit debt monetisation may endan-
ger the ECB’s reputation.
c The ECB may suffer losses in the event of sov-
ereign default.
d Moral hazard: by reducing the market pressure
on the beneficiary countries, the bond-buying
programme would simultaneously reduce the
incentives to consolidate and reform.
The ECB itself seems to have anticipated the latter14
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concern and made it very clear in the announce-
ment of the SMP that the Governing Council, in
making its decision, had “taken note of the state-
ment of the euro area governments that they
[would] ‘take all measures needed to meet [their]
fiscal targets [that] year and the years ahead in
line with excessive deficit procedures’ and of the
precise additional commitments taken by some
euro area governments to accelerate fiscal con-
solidation and ensure the sustainability of their
public finances”12.
Certainly, the policies adopted by governments
have a bearing on the effectiveness of the actions
of central banks. But the fact that the SMP
announcement formally refers to governments’
fiscal commitments raises important issues. First,
it suggests that a decision taken in the remit of
monetary policy had been to some extent subject
to fiscal considerations – despite the ECB not
being a fiscal policy-making institution. Second,
although the tone is vague enough not to estab-
lish any direct link (“taken note”), the statement
still seems to convey the message that without
such commitments, the ECB might have acted dif-
ferently. Since the SMP was subject to the full dis-
cretion of the Governing Council, the result seems
to be a sense of embryonic (and implicit) condi-
tionality: the ECB adopts measures to improve
monetary transmission, and thereby achieve its
Treaty-based primary objective of price stability,
only if governments do their homework.
The existence – and the risks – of such informal
conditionality became clear in August/September
2011, when the ECB started to buy Italian bonds.
It was not publicly disclosed at the time, but
before engaging in the Italian bond market the ECB
had sent a dry letter to Rome, listing a number of
measures that the ECB considered “essential”for
Italy at that juncture. No explicit reference was
obviously made to the SMP and the actions listed
in the letter were not described as conditions for
its activation. But the possibility that the ECB could
intervene to ease the escalating tensions on the
Italian bond market had been extensively dis-
cussed over the summer and the ECB started
buying Italian government bonds a few days after
the letter was sent.
The intervention was successful in easing the
pressure on Italian sovereign bonds (at least in
the short term), but by the end of the month the
Italian government publicly announced the inten-
tion to scrap a previously proposed ‘solidarity tax’.
For those critics of the SMP who had been warning
against the risk of moral hazard, this was a night-
mare coming true: the ECB had provided relief from
market pressure to a country whose government
was now backtracking on its commitments.
The OMT framework marks a shift to an entirely dif-
ferent level, in two respects. First, it introduces
explicit conditionality for the bond buying, which
is made subject to the activation of an ESM/EFSF
programme. Second, and most important, it
assigns to the ECB an equally explicit and active
role in the monitoring and assessment of compli-
ance with such conditionality, thus blurring even
more the thin red line between monetary and
fiscal policy and increasing the potential for con-
flicts of interests.
This setting puts the ECB in an extremely delicate
position. In the words of ECB president Mario
Draghi, the objective of the OMT is to “safeguard
the monetary policy transmission mechanism in
all countries of the euro area. [...] to preserve the
singleness of [...] monetary policy and to ensure
the proper transmission of our policy stance to the
real economy throughout the area”. As such, it
qualifies as a tool fully within the ECB’s monetary
policy scope. At the same time, however, it is a
monetary policy instrument, the activation and
use of which is made subject to considerations
that would not strictly pertain to a central bank in
the exercise of its monetary policy competences.
The ECB explicitly commits to terminate the OMT
not only – as would be logical – in case the latter
is no longer warranted from a monetary policy per-
spective, but also in case the beneficiary country
fails to comply with the required conditionality.
It therefore introduces an idea of monetary policy
with conditionality. As Nielsen (2012) points out,
this idea is quite unheard of and not easily justifi-
able from a theoretical perspective, not to mention
that it creates confusion about the ECB action. The
specific way in which this conditionality is struc-
tured is indeed problematic not just for the ECB’s
independence, but also for the survival of the euro.






CONTRIBUTION Darvas & Merler  THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK IN THE AGE OF BANKING UNION
1 First, it is unclear how compliance with the con-
ditionality would be assessed. The ECB will be
involved, with the European Commission and
possibly the IMF, in future ESM-funded finan-
cial assistance programmes, according to the
ESM Treaty (see task 7 in section 2). This would
make it very difficult for the ECB to conduct a
fully independent assessment of conditional-
ity fulfilment and it could expose it to pressure
from the other institutions, even if the Govern-
ing Council will decide “in full discretion”13.
2 Second, in a case in which the OMT was war-
ranted from a monetary perspective, but the
conditionality was not met, the ECB would face
the dilemma between (a) interrupting the OMT
at the risk of possibly endangering the stabil-
ity of the euro area, and (b) continuing the OMT
at the risk of inflicting a fatal blow to its own
credibility. The latter could also undermine the
political support for the euro in creditor coun-
tries. The choice would be a very tough one, and
consequences could be dismal in either case.
There are no easy solutions to this quandary and,
in our view, this is the most problematic dilemma
that the ECB faces.
A possible – though imperfect – solution could be
to remove the ECB’s own assessment of the
fulfilment of the conditionality, and also to remove
the ECB’s contribution to the ESM’s assessment.
In turn, the latter would require changes to the
ESM Treaty, as we discussed in the previous
section. Therefore, the decision on compliance
with the conditionality would be based solely on
the ESM Board of Directors, and the ECB would
need to assess only if the OMT is warranted from a
monetary policy perspective, if the ESM Board of
Directors gives the green light. In such a system,
the responsibility for starting, and once started,
stopping or continuing the OMT when compliance
is either not met or on the borderline, would lie
with the Governors of the ESM Board, ie the
representatives of euro-area governments, who
have, in the first place, created a financial
assistance system in the euro area. This is
because in uncertain situations when compliance
is at question, markets will likely behave
nervously and therefore there would be a need for
an OMT from a monetary policy perspective.
On the other hand, such a system would under-
mine the ECB’s monetary policy independence,
because it would make it possible for monetary
policy measures to be taken based on the deci-
sions of a body other than the Governing Council.
Also, leaving the decision on compliance entirely
to a more political body is not without risks. The
ECB is in a privileged position to assess the finan-
cial risks facing member states and the euro area.
ESM Governors would not be able to have the
same information on their own, and if they receive
this information from the ECB in an informal way,
they may not take it sufficiently into account
when making decisions that can have political
repercussions. ECB involvement in the assess-
ment of compliance is therefore problematic and
valuable at the same time. Excluding it entirely
from the process of evaluating financial assis-
tance programmes may not be the best way to
square the circle.
Consequently, there is no correct solution to the
aforementioned dilemmas. When members of a
monetary union have large public debts, a lender
of last resort for governments is necessary to
avoid a bad equilibrium in which financial markets
force an otherwise solvent country into default
(De Grauwe, 2011). This cannot be unconditional,
as it would create moral hazard. But as the experi-
ence of the SMP indicates, informal conditionality
does not work, while formal conditionality
exposes the ECB to the major dilemmas discussed
in the two points above.
The best we can hope is that the OMT will never
need to be used, but if used, the country in ques-
tion will comply with the conditionality.
The alternative to the OMT would be to revise com-
pletely the framework for euro-area sovereign-
debt crisis management, by moving toward a
‘In a case in which the OMT was warranted from a monetary perspective, but the conditionality
was not met, the ECB would face a dilemma between interrupting the OMT at the risk of endanger-
ing euro-area stability, and continuing the OMT at the risk of a fatal blow to its own credibility.’
13. The technical features
of the OMT regulate the
assessment the following
way: “The Governing Coun-
cil will consider Outright
Monetary Transactions to
the extent that they are war-
ranted from a monetary
policy perspective as long
as programme conditional-
ity is fully respected, and
terminate them once their
objectives are achieved or
when there is non-compli-
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tary Transactions in full
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US-style system, in which state-level pubic debt
is small, there is no federal financial bail-out for
states, the central bank does not purchase state
debt and banks do not hold state debt. Under such
conditions, markets would discipline state public
finances well and an eventual default of a state
government would not undermine financial sta-
bility. Since public debts in most euro-area coun-
tries are high, steps toward such a system should
involve a much higher level of fiscal integration,
including the mutualisation of a significant share
of public debt (like the ‘Blue bonds’ of von
Weizsäcker and Delpla, 2010). Holding the
remaining national debt (‘Red Bonds’) could be
prohibited for banks, or at least higher capital
requirements could apply. This would reduce the
impact of a sovereign default on the country itself
and reduce contagion fears (Darvas, 2011). How-
ever, by drawing a parallel with US history,
O’Rourke and Taylor (2013) remind us that even
after the US political integration, it took a very long
and painful process to reach a high level of fiscal
integration. It is unfortunately unrealistic for the
euro-area to embark on such an immense change
in the foreseeable future.
4 CONCLUSION
After gaining a strong reputation as the guardian
of price stability in the euro area, the European
Central Bank’s roles have been greatly extended
during the crisis, taking in monetary policy and
other areas. The good news is that the new tasks
have not endangered (at least so far) the ECB’s
ability to anchor the inflation expectations of
market participants: five-year-ahead expectations
continue to be anchored at the two percent target.
Nevertheless, the new tasks pose major chal-
lenges for the ECB and give rise to both synergies
and conflicts of interests. We have reviewed the
new tasks and assessed five major interactions
between them.
First, while liquidity provision to banks at a mas-
sive scale can stabilise financial markets in a
stress situation, it can keep alive otherwise insol-
vent banks, encourage excessive risk taking and
indirectly finance governments (when banks
borrow cheaply from the ECB to purchase govern-
ment bonds). The new EMU architecture has the
potential to limit these adverse side-effects: the
ECB can foster bank restructuring by performing
in the toughest possible way the comprehensive
balance sheet assessment before it takes over the
single supervisory role and, after that, micro-pru-
dential supervisory powers can be used to ensure
that all banks receiving liquidity support have
indeed only a liquidity problem, and not a sol-
vency problem. The architecture could be further
extended to dispel all doubts that liquidity provi-
sion to banks is backdoor financing of public debt:
longer-term ECB financing could be conditional on
banks not increasing their net lending to the gov-
ernment and/or increasing their net lending to the
real economy.
Second, there is a potential synergy between
monetary, micro-prudential and macro-prudential
policies. Risks can build up in the financial sector
even when the price stability mandate is
achieved; monetary policy, on its own, is not able
to counterbalance such risks. This is especially
true in a heterogeneous monetary union like the
EMU. Micro- and macro-prudential tools can help
to limit the build-up of such risks, leading to syn-
ergies. But there is a potential for conflicts of inter-
est too, for example, in a situation when an
interest rate increase is needed for monetary
policy purposes but such an increase would have
a critical impact on the balance sheet of banks.
Monetary policy credibility may also be under-
mined by eventual supervisory failures. In our
view, these risks are not high and also not shared
by markets, because long-term inflationary expec-
tations continue to be anchored. We also note,
however, that the limitations on the ECB’s macro-
prudential tools (eg the ECB cannot impose
requirements for loan-to-value ratios) may con-
strain effectiveness.
Third, the strict organisational separation of mon-
etary policy and bank supervision within the ECB,
which was a major goal of SSM regulation, is not
so important. On the contrary, because of syner-
gies between monetary policy and financial
supervision, an appropriate flow of information
would facilitate the achievements of the goals of
price and financial stability, even if the trans-
parency and accountability requirements of mon-
etary policy and supervisory decisions are
different. Recent organisational changes at the17
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Bank of England also encourage co-operation and
co-ordination across the different policy areas. 
Fourth, the roles played by the ECB in financial
assistance programmes as a partner of the Euro-
pean Commission and the IMF in the Troika is
ambiguous. The ECB’s participation in future assis-
tance programmes, which is formalised by the
treaty on the European Stability Mechanism, cre-
ates potential conflicts of interest with the other
tasks of the ECB, such as price stability, liquidity
provision to banks and the new bond purchasing
programme, the Outright Monetary Transactions
(OMTs). While the ECB’s expertise could bring valu-
able input into programme design and monitoring,
the conflicts of interest may alter the ECB’s posi-
tions and could be exposed pressures from the
other institutions of the Trokia. An informal role in
the design and monitoring of financial assistance
would lessen the possible conflicts of interests. 
Fifth, the ECB’s government bond purchasing pro-
grammes were essential to avoid financial melt-
down in the euro area. But this cannot be
unconditional, as it would create moral hazard and
other risks. The informal conditionality of the Secu-
rities Markets Programme did not work and the
formal conditionality of the OMTs exposes the ECB
to a major dilemma: if the OMT is warranted from a
monetary perspective, but the conditionality is not
met, the ECB would face the dilemma between (a)
interrupting the OMT at the risk of possibly endan-
gering the stability of the euro area, and (b) con-
tinuing the OMT at the risk of inflicting a fatal blow
to its own credibility. This could also undermine
the political support for the euro in creditor coun-
tries. On top of this dilemma, the involvement of
the ECB in the negotiation of an EFSF/ESM pro-
gramme within the Troika would make it very diffi-
cult for the ECB to conduct a fully independent
assessment of conditionality fulfilment and it
could expose it to pressure from the other institu-
tions. There is no proper solution to this quandary
of ‘monetary policy under conditionality’ within
the euro area’s current economic governance
framework. The alternative to the OMT would be a
complete revision of the framework for euro-area
sovereign debt crisis management and an
immense increase in fiscal integration, by moving
toward a system similar to the US, in which state-
level public debt is small, there is no federal finan-
cial bail-outs for states, the central bank does not
purchase state debt and banks do not hold state
debt. Unfortunately such an immense change for
the euro area is unrealistic in the foreseeable
future.
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